I’m a fan of Paul Tillich and his work in Systematic Theology. The fact that he rejects the idea of “either total salvation or total damnation” (the idea that only a tiny fraction of human beings will reach salvation is the contention of fundamentalism and conservative Catholicism) as “absurd and demonic” is enough to convince me of his thoughtfulness and commonsense as a Christian. As an existentialist, nay, one of its pioneers, he also criticizes the traditional “split” of Christ’s salvific role as prophet, priest, and king, saying that while they’re liturgically useful, the true signficance of Jesus Christ is his being, and the prophetic, priestly and kingly elements within it are immediate consequences of his being, not special offices connected with his work. Surely this conception of the Christian saviour will generate much discussion amongst classical theologians and existentialists alike.
I disagree with his distinction between historical and non-historical religions, because Garma Chang astutely brings in a third conception of religious history: “trans-historical,” which is unique to the Mahayana Buddhism of Hua-Yen (and by implication, much of Chinese Buddhism) and I would suspect several schools of Hinduism as well. Tillich’s idea of historical religions as superior to non-historical ones is fair enough since it’s more of an academic and spiritual opinion, whilst his classification of Buddhism as a non-historical religion is not very fair IF one takes into account Chang’s classification of it as a trans-historical religion. Tillich unwittingly alludes to this on pg. 110 of his Systematic Theology II when he notes that in discussing Christ, “a question arises which has been carefully avoided by many traditional theologians,” and this is how the meaning of the symbol “Christ” can be understood amidst the immensity of the cosmos, the tiny part of the universe that man and his history make up, and the possibility of other worlds in which divine revelations may appear.
The answer was given long ago in the grand Avatamsaka Sutra. Indeed, I would not have advocated Mahayana Buddhism if nothing in it addressed this issue of “other worlds” and “the vastness of empty space,” which are undeniable scientific truths and must be incorporated into religious worldviews if the latter are to remain profound and true (perhaps truer than older religious interpretations – science can prove to be an ally in this case). Tillich can only answer this issue by restricting the revelation of Christ to historical mankind: as its central event, he creates the meaning of human history. The eternal relation of God to man is manifest in Christ, and this basic answer leaves the universe open for possible divine manifestations in other areas/periods of being. In Tillich’s words, “Incarnation is unique for the special group in which it happens, but it is not unique in the sense that other singular incarnations for other unique worlds are excluded… Man cannot claim to occupy the only possible place for Incarnation.” (1957, pg. 111)
Surely, for some absolutist Christians, Tillich represents a big, humbling slap to the face. At the same time, I appreciate his authentically Christian humility, although personally I would say that this answer has been answered adequately already by Mahayana Buddhism, due to its Dharmic heritage of compassion for all sentient beings (“sentientism”). But anyway, either way you take Tillich, he certainly generates much fruitful discussion amongst everyone, which is typical of many existentialists.
